i. a Broader Perspective on Foreknowledge: Divine Causation
Before entering into the issue of divine foreknowledge, let us briefly outline the broader picture and address the logically prior issue of divine causation in order to understand why an adequate explanation of divine foreknowledge is of paramount importance in Molina's philosophical theology. Divine foreknowledge is a key component in and a necessary condition of divine providential care and governance of the course of the world. yet in the broader metaphysical framework of philosophical theology, the problem (i) how god knows singular future contingent states of affairs has to be squared with solutions to other issues; namely, (ii) the logically prior question of how god brings about the causal action of natural agents, (iii) a particular conception of human free choice and moral responsibility, and, possibly, (iv) god's causal responsibility for evil in the world. a particular solution to (ii) can have a direct effect on the solutions to (i) and (iii), as well as (iv). the desiderata of an orthodox Christian theism shared by the various late scholastic schools of thought are clear:
1. god as the first cause has to be causally responsible for any logically contingent state of affairs, at least in the sense of his action being a necessary if not sufficient cause of the truth of any logically contingent statement.
2. god knows the truth of any logically contingent statement including the statements about singular future states of affairs which are either human free decisions or the result of these. 3. Humans have to possess free choice, defined in such a way that it is sufficient for their being morally responsible for their actions. 4. god is in no way directly causally responsible for evil.
Molina developed his theory in opposition to 16th-century thomism, which interprets the first desideratum strictly:1 god being the first cause requires divine action to be the sufficient cause of any logically contingent state of affairs. Consequently, it is easy to uphold claim 2, as god knows his intended sufficient causal contributions to any future happening. so in thomism, foreknowledge is easy to explain. the price to pay is high, however, for it is doubtful whether claim 3 can be met in thomism. Freedom of choice has to be characterized in compatibilist terms. in any case, it cannot be libertarian (i.e. excluding any sufficient causal determination prior to the self-determination of the free choice capacity itself ). it is also much more difficult to exonerate god from direct causal involvement in evil.
in contrast, Molina denies that god would sufficiently determine human volition. what is more, opponents charged Molina with not doing justice to claim 1, for his theory makes god a necessary condition of any logically contingent state of affairs only in a weak sense. Hence, in comparison to thomism, the consequences for the remaining claims are inverse: foreknowledge of future free states of affairs is not easily explained, because divine causal contribution is not sufficient. since god does not sufficiently determine human volition, the resolution of divine will concerning the course of the world, existing from eternity, is not a sufficient source by itself to know in advance which of the contradictory pair of propositions about at present causally indetermined singular future states of affairs is true. thus an ingenious account of divine knowledge is needed which does not rely on divine will but, instead, on some special powers of divine intellect. it is the task of the present study to outline the contours of such a theory put forward by Molina and others. on the other hand, a Molinist
